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Abstract  
The political economy of finance literature emphasizes the critical role of political institutions 
in promoting financial development. Related empirical findings highlight a robust positive 
effect of democratic regimes on financial development compared to dictatorships. However, 
no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining the financial 
development enhancing effect of democracies. In this paper, we study the effects of 
disaggregated political institutions on financial development along three institutional 
dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules and state forms. Using a large panel 
of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, 
since the positive effect of democracies on financial development clearly depends on the 
precise institutional dimensions at work, namely: parliamentary governments and, to a lesser 
extent federal states. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by 
showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster 
financial development. 
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1. Introduction 
A vast body of literature highlights a positive effect of financial development on economic 
growth (Schumpeter, 1911; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997, 2005), as well as on the 
improvement of populations’ well-being (Beck et al., 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2008; Guillaumont-Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). As a result, understanding the determinants 
of financial development has become a critical issue in the recent literature (Voghouei et al., 
2011a). From this standpoint, institutions can be viewed as forefront long-run determinants of 
financial development. In this respect, the political economy of finance literature shows that 
better political institutions improve financial development through two key mechanisms: (i) 
more constrains on political leaders’ discretion and (ii) more inclusiveness of the political 
decision-making process (Haber and Perotti, 2008). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
this literature has so far assessed the effect of political institutions on financial development 
mainly through the opposition between democracies and dictatorships (Girma and Shortland, 
2004; Huang, 2010; Voghouei et al. 2011b; Yang, 2011).     
 Yet, Acemoglu (2005) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that the concept of 
democratic regime indiscriminately gathers a set of economic institutions (for example, the 
limitation of government’s expropriation power related to property rights protection) and 
political institutions (for example, the various constitutional rules in place). Therefore, as 
Voigt (2011) suggests, it is necessary to go beyond the simple opposition between autocratic 
and democratic regimes.         
 In this paper, we open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic 
regimes, and explore the effects of disaggregated political institutions on financial 
development. We take advantage of constitutional economics and comparative politics 
literature, which provided valuable theoretical explanations regarding the effects of 
alternatives constitutional arrangements within democratic regimes on the political decision-
making process. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we disaggregate the 
overall effect of democratic regimes on financial development along three institutional 
dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules and state forms, with the goal of 
emphasizing the democratic institutional features that matter for explaining differences in 
financial development between autocracies and democracies.
1
    
  
                                                          
1
 In the comparative politics literature, these three political institutions are considered as the most representative features of 
democratic regimes (Gerring et al., 2005). 
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 While we confirm that democratic regimes significantly increase financial 
development, our results show that institutional details are of crucial importance. Indeed, the 
positive effect of democracies on financial development is all the more important if 
democratic regimes are associated to parliamentary governments and, to a lesser extent, to 
federal states. Therefore, contrary to the traditional opposition between centralist and 
decentralist paradigms in political governance theories, the institutional setting promoting 
most the depth of financial activities, combines weak horizontal separation of powers 
(parliamentary governments) and strong vertical separation of powers (federal states). It 
reflects the constitutional arrangement of countries like Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, India, Pakistan and Spain for instance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, 
section 3 presents the data and the methodology, section 4 illustrates our main results, section 
5 analyzes the robustness of our findings, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review 
We first discuss the literature on the relationship between political institutions and financial 
development. Then, based on constitutional economics and comparative politics, we take a 
closer look at the theoretical mechanisms linking political institutions to financial 
development. 
2.1. Political institutions and financial development 
In reference to Haber and Perotti (2008), two major institutional features enable to understand 
the effect of better political institutions on financial development. On the one hand, stronger 
control over political leaders’ discretion ultimately results in better property rights protection 
and better implementation of contracts. This in turn decrease risks related to investment 
projects and therefore leads to an increased in capital accumulation.
2
  One the other hand, 
more political rights induces more participation of citizen in the political decision-making 
process, as well as more constraints on choices made by political leaders. This results in the 
implementation of laws fostering access to a broader part of the population to financial 
systems, as well as more openness of domestic financial markets.
3
   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
2 See for instance North and Weingast (1989) on the English Glorious Revolution in the late 17th century. 
3 For example, the United States during the first half of the 19th century and Mexico in the late 1990’s. 
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 From this standpoint, the effect of political institutions on financial development has 
been considered so far in the empirical literature in the following two ways. First, the impact 
of political regimes (democracies versus dictatorships) on financial development. Here, 
empirical analyses of Girma and Shortland (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Huang 
(2010), Voghouei et al. (2011b) and Yang (2011) highlight a robust positive impact of 
democracies on financial development. Second, the effect of democratic political institutions, 
i.e. constitutional arrangements, on financial development. In this respect, very few empirical 
studies have addressed this issue (Bordo and Rousseau, 2006; Boudriga and Ghardallou, 
2012). As a result, we need to characterize the relationship between democracies and financial 
development in a more in-depth way. To do this, we deal with three main constitutional 
features of democratic regimes, namely forms of government, electoral rules and state forms.  
2.2. Political governance theories: a closer look at political institutions                     
According to Persson and Tabellini (2003), political institutions can be viewed as the 
institutional framework constraining the political decision-making process. As such, they 
ultimately explain the nature and quality of the implemented policies in a given political 
system.
4
            
 The literature discussed in section 2.1 insists on two main institutional mechanisms to 
explain the better ability of democracies to foster financial development compared with 
dictatorships: (i) the extent of constraints faced by political leaders when implementing public 
policies, and (ii) the inclusiveness of the political decision-making process. To explore this 
issue more in-depth, and link our political institutions variables to financial development, we 
draw upon comparative politics theories on political governance. At this point, we need to 
acknowledge that the literature on the political institutions-financial development nexus 
explains the financial development enhancing effect of better political institutions with 
institutional mechanisms very similar to those highlighted in political science for 
characterizing the nature of political governance associated to a given political system, 
namely the degree of (i) authority and (ii) inclusion of the political decision-making process 
(Gerring et al., 2005). As a result, linking these two concepts to the institutional determinants 
of financial development should help us to identify the precise forms of democracies that 
could foster the most financial development.       
                                                          
4 Comprehensive literature reviews on the economic and political effects of political institutions include Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) and Voigt (2011). 
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 Overall, the literature on political governance theories is structured around two main 
paradigms (Gerring et al., 2009).         
 On the one hand, to provide a stable environment, political leaders’ behavior should be 
the most predictable possible (Henisz, 2000, 2004; Stasavage and Keefer, 2003), and 
emphasis must be placed on separation, diffusion, and fragmentation of political power. This 
political governance model is called decentralist in terms of horizontal separation of powers 
(i.e. the relationship between Executive and Legislative powers) and federalist regarding 
vertical separation of powers (i.e. the relationship between central governments and local 
powers). In this case, constitutional arrangements the most efficient in promoting a stable 
political environment are presidential forms of government, proportional electoral rules and 
federal states form.
5
 This political institutions setup allows a strong reduction in political 
leaders’ authority and increases the inclusiveness of the political decision-making process. 
This is precisely in line with the political economy of finance literature emphasizing a 
positive effect of political institutions on financial development if they reduce political 
leaders’ discretion and increase the inclusiveness of the political decision-making process.  
 On the other hand, to adapt to changes in the economic, social and cultural 
environment, emphasis must be placed on the concentration of political power, with a flexible 
government having a strong leadership and being able to defeat significant conflicts of 
interests (Olson, 1982; Gerring et al., 2005, 2009). This political governance model is called 
centralist in terms of horizontal separation of powers and unitarist regarding vertical 
separation of powers. In this case, constitutional arrangements fostering a flexible political 
decision-making process are parliamentary forms of government, majoritarian electoral rules 
and unitary states.
6
 This political institutions setup enables a softer limitation of political 
leader’s authority and decrease the inclusiveness of the political decision-making process. In 
this respect, the law and finance literature (LaPorta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003) stresses that 
resistance to change is one of the main features of Civil Law systems which explains their 
poor performances in terms of financial development compared to Common Law ones. Hence, 
if we apply this theoretical argument to the relationship between political institutions and 
                                                          
5 This constitutional configuration is also related to the Lijphart’s (2002) consensus model of democracy. It refers for 
instance to the Swiss constitutional arrangement. 
6 This constitutional configuration is also related to the Lijphart’s (2002) majoritarian model of democracy. It refers for 
instance to the Westminster (UK) constitutional arrangement. 
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financial development, one should expect a financial development enhancing effect of 
political institutions related to a limited horizontal and vertical separation of political powers.
7
    
As result, identifying specific institutional features of democratic regimes that seem to 
a priori increase financial development is a fairly difficult task, which calls for a more 
detailed empirical analysis, since both paradigms of political governance have theoretical 
underpinnings suggesting their positive effect on financial development. Thus, our empirical 
analysis can be view as a test of the following two hypotheses:                                   
 
Hypothesis #1 (the political economy of finance hypothesis): in order to foster 
financial development, emphasis should be placed on a stable political environment and 
constitutional arrangements the most efficient in achieving this goal are presidential forms of 
government, proportional electoral rules and federal states forms. 
Hypothesis #2 (the law and finance hypothesis): in order to foster financial 
development, emphasis should be placed on a flexible political environment and 
constitutional arrangements the most efficient in achieving this goal are parliamentary forms 
of government, proportional electoral rules and unitary states forms. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data                 
We explore the relationship between political institutions and financial development using a 
panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007.
8
 We use three-year averaged data as a compromise 
between two conflicting issues. On the one hand, the use of panel data allows accounting for 
within countries dynamics of financial development and its determinants. On the other hand, 
the FEVD estimator we draw upon is typically suited for panels with relatively large cross-
sections and small time dimensions.  
3.2. Financial development  
In reference to Huang (2010), Voghouei et al. (2011b) and Boudriga and Ghardallou (2012), 
we use a composite index in order to account for financial development in a multidimensional 
                                                          
7 Furthermore, Gerring et al. (2005) define a centripetal model of political governance slightly different to the traditional 
centralist model. This model enables less constraint on political leaders’ discretion and more inclusion of the political 
decision-making process. Constitutional arrangements characterizing this model of political governance are parliamentary 
forms of government, proportional electoral rules and unitary states forms. 
8 Countries and time periods in our sample were selected on data availability. Table A in appendix 2 gives the list of 
countries in our sample. 
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way. According to Beck et al. (2008) and Cihak et al. (2012), financial development is a 
multidimensional concept, involving different actors (e.g. banks and stock markets), and 
different concepts, such as the size, stability and efficiency of financial systems. Ideally, our 
analysis should include all these dimensions to characterize the relationship between political 
institutions and financial development. However, given the limited availability of data for 
stock markets, as well as for the access and efficiency dimensions of financial development, 
we focus on broadly-available variables measuring the depth of financial institutions. 
 Our composite index of financial development is derived from the extraction of the 
first factor from the implementation of a Principal Component Analysis (henceforth PCA) to 
the following three indicators coming from the World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database of Cihak et al. (2012): 
1. Liquid liabilities to GDP (measured by the ratio M3/GDP), as an indicator of the size 
of financial intermediaries’ liabilities.  
2. Private credit to GDP (measured by the ratio of credits to the private sector by 
banking and non-banking institutions over GDP), as an index of the activity of 
financial intermediaries from the perspective of one of their main functions, namely to 
canalize savings towards investment.
9 
3. Deposit money bank assets/GDP (measured as deposit banks assets/GDP), as an 
indicator of the size of financial intermediaries. 
 The resulting composite index of financial development associated to the first factor 
derived from the PCA (with an eigenvalue of 2.83) accounts for 94% of the total variance of 
these three variables. This result ensures that this variable depicts in a relevant way the overall 
banking sector depth dynamic for each country in our sample.
10 
 
3.3. Political institutions             
Regarding political institutions, we created a binary indicator of political regimes based on the 
Polity2 index from the PolityIV database of Marshall and Jaggers (2010). Consistent with the 
classification of Przeworski et al. (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003), Persson (2005), or 
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), this variable equals 0 (1) for autocratic (democratic) regimes, 
                                                          
9 Levine (1997, 2005) considers this indicator as a good proxy for financial development. Moreover, it is one of the most 
commonly used indicators in the recent empirical literature on determinants of financial development. 
10 In addition, Table I in appendix 2 shows that these three banking sector variables are strongly correlated to each other, 
which further confirms the relevance of a PCA in order to compute a composite index of financial development.  
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namely when the Polity2 index is negative (positive).
11
 Since our data are three-year 
averaged, a country is considered as democratic for the corresponding sub-period if it has a 
democratic regime during all three years, and as autocratic if not. Tables A in appendix 2 
gives the distribution of political regimes for each country in our sample. 
However, this political regimes variable only measures the aggregated dimension of 
democratic regimes. Thus, to go one step further, we follow Voigt (2012) and capture three 
additional and essential features of democracies, namely government forms, electoral rules 
and state forms.  
These three constitutional arrangement variables are built as follows. Observations 
corresponding to democratic regimes (modality 1 of the political regimes variable) and 
characterized by a specific constitutional arrangement (e.g. parliamentary forms of 
government) are equal to 1. Otherwise, i.e. when the constitutional arrangement (e.g. semi-
presidential and presidential governments) or the political regime (e.g. autocratic regimes) do 
not correspond to the institutional modality studied, observations are equal to 0. This way, we 
obtain three sets of constitutional arrangements variables: (i) three binary variables of 
government forms, equal to 1 if in a democratic regime government form is rather 
parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presidential, respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise (data 
used to create these variables come from the database of Cheibub et al., 2009); (ii) three 
binary variables of electoral rules, equal to 1 if in a democratic regime the electoral rule for 
electing members of the Lower House of Parliament is rather majoritarian, mixed, or 
proportional, respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise (data used to create these variables come 
from the database of Bormann and Golder, 2013);
12
 and (iii) two binary variables of state 
forms, equal to 1 if in a democratic regime state form is rather unitary or federal, respectively, 
and equal to 0 otherwise (data used to create these variables come from the overlap of two 
sources, namely the 2013 World Factbook database from the CIA, and political data from 
each country sheet from the website Perspective Monde of Sherbrook University). 
To summarize, the use of these eight political institutions variables allows us to 
disaggregate the overall effect of democratic regimes, with the goal of emphasizing what type 
of constitutional arrangements matter for explaining differences in terms of financial 
development between autocratic and democratic regimes. In particular, including autocratic 
                                                          
11 Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) show that using a zero threshold for the Polity2 variable in order to differentiate between 
democracies and dictatorships is particularly relevant, as crossing it (from negative to positive) is usually consistent with a 
significant improvement of institutions in the short-run, followed by a more gradual improvement. 
12 Since countries do not necessarily have a unicameral structure of their legislative power, we focus, to allow comparability 
of electoral rules across countries, on the electoral rule for the elections of members of the Lower House of Parliament. 
Études et Documents n° 23, CERDI, 2015 
11 
 
regimes in the reference modality (0) of each political institution variable means that their 
estimated coefficients must be interpreted as the financial development differential between 
autocracies and democracies having this specific institutional feature.
13
 Tables B1 and B2 in 
appendix 2 gives the distribution of our constitutional arrangements variables for each country 
in our sample. 
3.4 Descriptive statistics          
Table 1 highlights that banking sector depth is 70% higher in democratic regimes with respect 
to autocratic regimes. This result holds when we look at each of the three components of our 
aggregate index of financial development since compared to dictatorships, democratic 
regimes has a private credit/GDP ratio two times larger than autocratic regimes, as well as 
bank assets/GDP and liquid liabilities/GDP ratios 90% and 43% higher than autocratic ones, 
respectively.  
Table 1.  Political Regimes, Democratic Political Institutions and Financial Development 
  
Financial 
depth 
Private 
credit/GDP 
Bank 
assets/GDP 
Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
Political Regimes 
   
  
Autocracy -0.47 22.22 28.99 35.99 
Democracy 0.24 45.12 55.22 51.47 
Forms of 
Democracies 
        
Government Forms 
   
  
Presidential 0.03 35.49 41.44 43.01 
Semi-presidential 0.08 44.18 52.51 44.4 
Parliamentary 0.6 57.66 73.14 63.61 
Electoral Rules 
   
  
Majoritarian 0.19 42.01 51.77 51.07 
Mixt 0.39 51.23 63.17 60.23 
Proportional 0.3 47.32 57.74 50.68 
State Forms 
   
  
Unitary 0.12 39.95 48.55 47.66 
Federal 0.5 58 72.4 60.71 
Note: mean of financial development variables over 1984-2007 by political regimes and 
constitutional arrangements. 
 
 Moreover, such differences persist and are magnified when considering disaggregated 
political institutions variables: financial depth index lies between 0.03 for presidential 
governments and 0.60 for parliamentary governments.  Overall, parliamentary governments 
                                                          
13 Moreover, including autocracies in the reference modality (0) of each political institution variable allows us to exploit not 
only the between-country variability of political institutions, but also their within-country variability, due to the presence in 
our sample of a moderate number of countries that experienced at least one political transition from autocratic to democratic 
regimes (and vice-versa). 
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seem to be the most financial development enhancing constitutional arrangement, followed by 
federal states (0.50) and finally by mixed (0.39) and proportional (0.30) electoral rules. These 
results are the same when dealing with each of the three components of our aggregate index 
of financial development. Such differences call for a more detailed analysis of the effect of 
disaggregated political institutions on financial development. 
3.5. Political institutions: non-random selection and high inertia in panel data 
According to Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004), the econometric analysis of the effects of 
political institutions faces two majors challenges, related to their non-random selection and 
their high inertia. 
The non-random selection problem is related to the specification of our econometric 
model. Tables D and E in appendix 2 show that both political institutions and financial 
development are correlated with long-run geographic, historical and economic development 
factors, such as colonial and legal origins and income per capita. From this standpoint, 
drawing upon panel data to account for both observed heterogeneity (through control 
variables) and unobservable country and temporal heterogeneity (through country effects and 
time dummies), allows us to better tackle the potential non-random selection of political 
institutions. In addition, from a short-term perspective, Table E1 in appendix 2 shows that 
political institutions differ substantially along several first-order determinants of financial 
development, such as: trade and financial openness, inflation, inflation volatility and GDP 
growth. Thus, to avoid a misleading evaluation of the relationship between political 
institutions and financial development, we need to account for these short-term economic 
factors in our econometric specification. 
As for the high inertia problem, it refers to the choice of the most appropriate 
estimator. Table A in appendix 1 shows that among the 140 countries in our sample, only 55 
experienced at least one political transition from autocracy to democracy (or vice versa) over 
1984-2007. The same inertia of political institutions is at work regarding constitutional 
reforms in democratic regimes (see Tables B1 and B2 in appendix 2): only 17 constitutional 
reforms in permanent democracies (of which 14 are related to electoral rules) and only 9 
constitutional reforms in countries with political transitions (of which 7 are related to electoral 
rules). Finally, as illustrated by Table C in appendix 2, political regimes and constitutional 
arrangements variables display small within variability with respect to their between 
variability. 
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Given (i) potential endogeneity and (ii) high inertia of political institutions, we are left 
with few appropriate panel data methods. Regarding (i) endogeneity, the use of Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM, see Persson and Tabellini, 2007) is inappropriate for our analysis, 
which focuses on the disaggregated effect of political institutions. Indeed, in the case of our 
constitutional arrangements variables, a matching estimator would be impossible to 
implement with no less than eight treatment variables. In addition, as emphasized by 
Acemoglu (2005), the instrumental variables used so far in the literature
14
 represent relevant 
determinants of a global institutional concept such as political regimes, including economic 
and political institutions, but certainly not instruments of the precise constitutional 
arrangements in place in a given democratic system. Furthermore, since we study in this 
paper the effects of eight political institutions variables on financial development, we would 
need at least two specific instruments for each political institution. Clearly, this represents a 
very challenging exercise given the aim of our paper. 
Regarding (ii) inertia, the traditional within estimator would limit our analysis 
exclusively to the very limited subset of countries having experienced at least one political 
transition over 1984-2007, while a Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator with 
country dummies would absorb most of the effects of the highly inertial institutional 
variables. Moreover, albeit the RE model is appropriate for estimating the effects of highly 
inertial variables, one challenging underlying assumption is the orthogonality between 
political institutions and random effects. This hypothesis is all the more likely to be respected 
if the variance proportion of our dependent variable explained by random effects is relatively 
small, which is not the case in our context as shown by preliminary estimates.
15
 An alternative 
solution could be to resort to the Hausman-Taylor estimator (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) for 
correlated random effects. Nevertheless, this estimator is not suited in the case of highly 
inertial variables since it accounts for the correlation between explanatory variables and 
random effects by defining internal instruments including the within transformation of 
endogenous variables. Hence, like a fixed effect model using a within transformation, the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator enables us to instrument our political institutions variables only for 
                                                          
14 For example, Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) instrument forms of government and electoral rules by the timing of 
adoption of the current constitution (between 1921-1950, between 1951-1980 and after 1980), cultural and geographic 
variables from Hall and Jones (1999), legal origin variables from La Porta et al. (1998), and colonial history variables from 
Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
15 When estimating the effects of our political institutions variables on financial development, we systematically obtained a 
variance proportion of our dependent variable explained by the random effects above 70%. Results are available upon 
request. 
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countries which have experienced at least one political transition over 1984-2007.
16
 Finally, 
the inertia in institutions makes the use of the System-GMM estimator problematic, as 
applying the first-difference (to remove country unobserved heterogeneity in the difference 
equation and to instrument endogenous variables in the level equation) limits our sample to 
countries characterized by at least one political transition.  
Taking into account these limitations, a viable strategy is to resort to the Fixed Effects 
Vector Decomposition (henceforth FEVD) estimator from Plümper and Troeger (2007, 2011) 
to assess the relationship between political institutions and financial development. This 
commonly used estimator in comparative politics is dedicated to the estimation of time-
invariant and rarely changing variables in panel data models with country fixed effects.
17
 In 
addition, Plümper and Troeger (2011), in response to Greene (2011) and Breush et al. (2011) 
criticisms, show that the FEVD estimator outperforms any other estimator when estimating 
models including time-varying variables correlated with unobserved individual effects and 
highly inertial explanatory variables, which precisely corresponds to our analysis framework. 
3.6. The econometric model 
In order to disaggregate the overall effect of democratic regimes on financial development, in 
a context of political institutions variables characterized by non-random selection and high 
inertia, we estimate the following model using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), with 
the exception of the country fixed effects ui, and the FEVD estimator (Plümper-Troeger, 
2007, 2011). 
1
K
it k kit it i t it
k
Y X W u v   

                                                                                           (1)                                                                                                   
Y stands for banking sector depth, 𝛼 is a constant term, X includes our political institutions 
variables (with K  the number of modalities for each categories of political institution tested) 
and W is a the vector of traditional determinants of financial development, namely the 
logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP growth, the logarithm of the inflation rate, inflation 
volatility, a de jure measure of financial openness and the logarithm of commercial 
openness.
18
  𝑣𝑡 refers to time dummies, ui denotes country fixed effects and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term.  
                                                          
16 Alternatively, drawing upon Mundlak’s (1978) correlated random effects model, involving the use of country-specific 
averages of covariates, is equally inappropriate for our analysis, because this new set of variables would absorb most of the 
effects of our political institutions variables. 
17
 See Caldeira (2012), Caldeira et al. (2012) and Heinemann et al. (2014) for recent implementations of this estimator. 
18 Appendix 1 presents the sources and the construction of these variables, and Tables E1 and E2 in appendix 2 provide 
descriptive statistics. 
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 In order to briefly summarize the logic behind the FEVD estimator, we start with the 
following simplify version of eq. (1):  
it it it i itY X W                                           (2) 
 In a first step, we exclude the highly inertial variable X from eq. (1) and estimate this 
equation using OLS with a within data transformation:   
( ) ( ) ( )it i it i it iY Y W W                                                                    (3)            
 This enables to derive an estimate of the country fixed effects:  
i i i iY W                              (4)                                                                                                                                
 In a second step, the predicted country fixed effects from step 1 are regressed on the 
inertial explanatory variables using OLS, in order to extract ih , the remaining part of country 
fixed effects unexplained by the inertial variables X:  
i it iX h                             (5) 
 In a third step, the predicted unexplained part of the fixed effects ih  from step 2 is 
introduced in eq. (2), which is estimated by OLS:  
it it it i itY X W h                                (6) 
4. Results  
4.1. Political regimes              
Regressions (1)-(3) in Table 2 show that irrespective to the estimated specification, 
democracies significantly increases financial development compared to dictatorships. Indeed, 
democracies improve financial depth by 70% (column 1), and then by 60% when we resort to 
the FEVD estimator and account for control variables (columns 2-3). Therefore, in line with 
previous results in the empirical literature on the relationship between political regimes and 
financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Girma and Shortland, 2008; Huang, 
2010; Voghouei et al., 2011b; Yang, 2011), we find a significant and positive effect of 
democracies on financial development. Compared to autocratic regimes, democracies increase 
the inclusiveness of the political decision-making process, as well as constrains on political 
leaders’ discretion; which in turn favor the enactment of laws promoting a broader access for 
population to formal financial systems and ensuring a deeper competition on domestic 
financial markets (Haber and Perotti, 2008). 
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4.2. Constitutional arrangements                                                        
Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Gerring et al. (2005, 2009) insist on the fact that different 
constitutional arrangements in democratic regimes involve different levels of inclusiveness of 
the political decision-making process, as well as different levels of constraints on political 
leaders’ discretion. As a result, we need to identify what precise constitutional arrangements 
in a given democratic system matter for increasing financial development compared to 
dictatorships.
19
          
 Regarding forms of government, parliamentary governments have an estimated 
coefficient statistically higher to the estimated coefficient associated to the democratic 
regimes variable. Especially, parliamentary governments increase banking sector depth by 
86% compared to autocratic regimes (column 6) and by 33% relative to the overall effect of 
democratic regimes (difference between columns 3 and 6). According to political governance 
theories, parliamentary governments are flexible forms of government allowing more 
discretion for political leaders and enabling to defeat significant conflicts of interests in the 
political decision-making process (Gerring et al. 2005, 2009). Therefore, parliamentary 
governments contribute to enhance financial development due to their better adaptation 
capacity to changes in the economic, social and cultural environment, which gives support to 
our hypothesis #2 in terms of horizontal separation of political power.   
 Moreover, moving to electoral rules, columns 7 and 8 show that mixed and 
proportional electoral rules have an estimated coefficient statistically higher to the estimated 
coefficient of democratic regimes.  However, these results are not robust when we account for 
controls variables in column 9. Thus, contrary to Bordo and Rousseau (2006), our results do 
not suggest that electoral rules play a critical role in explaining the effect of democratic 
regimes on financial development.                   
 Finally, when dealing with states forms, columns 10 to 12 highlight that federal states 
have an estimated coefficient statistically higher to the estimated coefficient of democratic 
regimes. According to column 12, federal states increase financial depth by 95% compared to 
autocracies and by 32% compared to the overall effect of democratic regimes (difference 
between columns 3 and 12). Political governance theories stress that federal states enable a 
strong vertical separation of power and increase the inclusiveness of the political decision-
                                                          
19
 Political regimes variable is used as a reference to capture the overall impact of democracies on financial development 
compared to autocracies. This benchmark variable enables us to uncover constitutional arrangements displaying the largest 
effect on financial depth. Thus, when dealing with constitutional arrangements variables, we compare each of these latter 
variables with the democratic reference, and only keep variables with an estimated coefficient higher than the estimated 
democratic regime benchmark coefficient. This way, we identify constitutional arrangements which enhance the most 
financial development. 
Études et Documents n° 23, CERDI, 2015 
17 
 
making process at local level (Gerring et al., 2005). Two main institutional features in line 
with our hypothesis #1, thus supporting the idea that a financial development enhancing 
constitutional arrangement in terms of vertical separation of power must be associated to a 
highly constrained and inclusive political-decision making process.
20
   
 
Table 2: Forms of Democracies and Financial Development 
 
  
Political Regimes Government Forms Electoral rules State Forms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD 
Democracy 0.701*** 0.596*** 0.633*** 
   
  
  
  
 
  
  [0.144] [0.122] [0.201]                   
Presidential   
 
  0.491*** 0.361 0.369   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  [0.179] [0.268] [0.294]   
  
  
 
  
Semi presidential 
  
  0.521** 0.362 0.321   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  [0.241] [0.309] [0.351]   
  
  
 
  
Parliamentary 
 
 
  1.070*** 0.979*** 0.864**   
  
  
 
  
       [0.170] [0.233] [0.393]             
Majoritarian 
  
  
   
0.632*** 0.487*** 0.512**   
 
  
  
  
  
   
[0.182] [0.185] [0.220]   
 
  
Mixt 
  
  
   
0.818*** 0.629*** 0.610**   
 
  
  
  
  
   
[0.239] [0.215] [0.249]   
 
  
Proportional 
  
  
   
0.731*** 0.615*** 0.521   
 
  
            [0.168] [0.225] [0.353]       
Unitary 
  
  
   
  
  
0.615*** 0.522*** 0.550*** 
  
  
  
   
  
  
[0.146] [0.129] [0.191] 
Federal 
  
  
   
  
  
0.987*** 0.866** 0.948* 
  
  
  
   
  
  
[0.211] [0.384] [0.514] 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 894 688 606 817 621 543 818 622 544 894 688 606 
R-squared 0.124 0.674 0.738 0.206 0.68 0.762 0.143 0.677 0.762 0.14 0.676 0.739 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
           Therefore, our results show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since 
the positive effect of democracies on financial development depends on the precise 
institutional dimensions at work. Further, our results go beyond traditional political 
governance theories since more financially developed countries are associated to democratic 
regimes allowing a flexible horizontal separation of power (with parliamentary governments) 
and a strong vertical separation of power (with federal states). Thus, in a given democratic 
regime, financial development will be all the more important if its constitutional arrangements 
enable low constrains on political leaders discretion at state level (horizontal dimension of 
                                                          
20 Further theoretical arguments might explain this positive effect of federal states on financial development. Indeed, a strong 
vertical separation of powers could favor a deeper and sounder competition of financial sector through foot voting effect 
(Tiebout, 1956; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Ribstein and Kobayashi, 2006) and laboratory effect (Hayek, 1939; Oates, 
1999). From this standpoint, foot voting effect could reflect citizens’ and entrepreneurs’ abilities to increase competition 
between local banks, thus encouraging these latters to implement attracting policies. Regarding laboratory effect, it could 
reflect incentive for information disclosure and dissemination between local jurisdictions about the best practices in terms of 
financial activities management. 
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political power) and strong inclusiveness of the political decision-making process at local 
level (vertical dimension of political power). Hence, these results uncover a complementarity 
relationship between the political economy of finance theory (hypothesis #1) and the law and 
finance theory (hypothesis #2), when dealing with the constitutional determinants of financial 
development. Concretely, in our sample, this political system reflects for instance the 
constitutional arrangements of countries such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, 
Pakistan and Spain.                
4.3. Political systems and joint estimates                                                                                    
We now go one step further and test the effect resulting from the interaction between 
parliamentary governments and federal states, namely the two constitutional arrangements 
which display a stronger effect on banking sector depth than democratic regimes as a whole. 
To this end, in Table 3, we resort to two strategies in order to account for these institutional 
interactions. On the one hand, we test a “synergistic effect” between parliamentary 
governments and federal states by computing a categorical variable equal to 0 for 
dictatorships, 1 for democracies, 2 for democracies with parliamentary governments or 
federal states, and 3 for parliamentary governments and federal states.
21
    
 On the other hand, we introduce in a same specification both parliamentary 
governments and federal states variables in order to check if the positive effect of both 
variables does not come from a systematic association between each other.
22
  
Table 3. Political Systems and Joint Estimates 
                                                          
21 Resorting to the computation of a categorical variable seems to be especially relevant in our study context because (i) we 
do not have enough sample observations to precisely estimate the effect associated to a binary variable of such a political 
system; and (ii) to have more detailed information on the interaction effects between these two constitutional arrangements. 
22 Indeed, Table G in appendix 2 displays a strong bilateral correlation between these two constitutional arrangements 
variables.  
  
Synergistic effect Competition 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD 
  
  
  
  
  
Synergy 0.450*** 0.402*** 0.364** 
  
  
  [0.0717] [0.0963] [0.162]       
Parliamentary       0.781*** 0.754*** 0.635* 
  
  
  [0.142] [0.254] [0.369] 
Federalism 
  
  0.408** 0.333 0.303 
        [0.197] [0.419] [0.512] 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 817 621 543 817 621 543 
R-squared 0.207 0.681 0.763 0.178 0.681 0.763 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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 Regarding the "synergistic effect", Table 3 shows that the interaction between 
parliamentary governments and federal states significantly increases financial depth by 154% 
to 205% compared to autocracies, by 86% to 110% relative to democracies having other 
constitutional arrangements, and by 36% to 45% compared to parliamentary non-federal 
governments or federal non-parliamentary states (columns 1-3).
23
 Therefore, these results 
stress the increased ability of a flexible federalism in order to foster financial activities, owing 
to its better adaptation capacities (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999, 2002), stronger political governance, 
increased limitation of lobbies’ bargaining power (Gerring et al., 2005, 2009) and broader 
inclusion of the political decision-making process at local level (Gerring et al., 2005).                   
 Moreover, when we jointly estimate the effect of parliamentary governments and 
federal states, Table 3 highlights that parliamentary governments have an estimated 
coefficient systematically and statistically higher to the estimated coefficient of federal states 
(columns 4-6). However, federal states loss their significance when we resort to the FEVD 
estimator (column 5) and further adding control variables (column 6).
24
 These results stress 
that parliamentary governments represent the key constitutional arrangement to ensure deeper 
and sounder financial development. As a result, Table 3 show that democratic regimes 
enhance financial development mainly through the top-down effect of parliamentary 
governments, allowing a flexible government with low constraints on political leaders 
discretion (Gerring et al., 2005, 2009), rather through the bottom-up effect of federal states, 
enabling a stable government and a broad inclusiveness of the political decision-making 
process at local level (Gerring et al., 2005). Thus, albeit complementary, the law and finance 
theories seem to better account for the enhancing financial development effect of democratic 
regimes rather than the political economy of finance theory.     
 Table 4 summarizes the institutional mechanisms that enable to explain our main 
results regarding the effects of governments and states forms on financial development.  
 
 
 
                                                          
23 For instance in Table 3 column 3, the estimated coefficient of the synergy variable is 0.364. In other words, when synergy 
equals to 1, this leads to an improvement in financial depth by 36.4%. Then, when synergy equals to 2, this induces an 
improvement in financial depth by (1.364)*0.364 = 86.05%. Finally, when synergy equals to 3, this leads to an improvement 
in financial depth by (1.8605)*0.364 = 153.77%. 
24 Our results are similar when we introduce proportional or mixt electoral rules. The estimated coefficients of proportional 
and mixed electoral rules are never significant when we account for parliamentary governments and federal states. Results 
are available upon request. 
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Table 4.  Constitutional Arrangements and Financial Development 
  
State forms 
(I) Unitary states (II) Federal States 
F
o
rm
s 
o
f 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
(A1) Presidential (A1) Strong or (A2) moderate constraints on the 
Executive 
(A1) Strong or (A2) moderate constraints on the 
Executive 
(A2) Semi 
presidential 
(I) Weak inclusion of the political decision 
making process at local level 
(II) Broad inclusion of the political decision 
making process at local level 
(B) Parliamentary 
(B) Low constraints on the Executive (B) Low constraints on the Executive 
(I) Weak inclusion of the political decision 
making process 
(II) Broad inclusion of the political decision 
making process at local level 
Note: in red, constitutional arrangements promoting the most financial development. 
5. Robustness 
We explore the robustness of our previous findings by taking into account (i) alternative 
measures of financial development, (ii) alternative measures of political institutions, 
accounting for (iii) outliers and (iv) reverse causality.
25
 
5.1. Alternative measure of financial development        
        In Tables A1 and A2, we check for an alternative definition of financial 
development. Our baseline indicator of financial depth relies on the first factor derived from 
the implementation of a PCA on the following variables: (i) bank assets/GDP, (ii) liquid 
liabilities/GDP and (iii) private credit/GDP. Our alternative measure of financial depth 
consists in replacing deposit money bank assets/GDP by deposit money bank assets to deposit 
money bank assets and central bank assets, as an index of the relative share of commercial 
banks in savings allocation. This latter variable comes from the Global Financial 
Development Database of Cihak et al. (2012).
26      
 Table A1 shows that whatever the estimator and empirical specification we account 
for, democracies keep their significant and positive effect on financial development (columns 
1 to 3). In addition, parliamentary governments and federal states still have a significant and 
positive effect on financial development (columns 4 to 6 and 10 to 12). Our baseline results 
are even reinforced under this alternative definition of financial development. Indeed, 
parliamentary governments increase banking sector depth by 107% compared to autocratic 
regimes (column 6) and by 30% relative to democratic regimes as a whole (differences 
between column 6 and 3). Likewise, federal states increase banking sector depth by 115% 
compared to dictatorships (columns 12) and by 37% relative to democratic regimes as a whole 
                                                          
25 To simplify the presentation of this section and save space, all tables are reported in appendix 3.  
26 This measure of financial development has also been used by Voghouei et al. (2011b).  
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(differences between column 6 and 3). Furthermore, we still have few evidence on the 
positive effect of mixed electoral rules on financial development, since their estimated 
coefficient is only 0.3% higher to the overall democratic regimes effect, when using the 
FEVD estimator with control variables (see column 9).      
 Moreover, in Table A2, we provide further evidences on a synergistic effect between 
parliamentary governments and federal states (columns 1-3), since banking sector depth 
increases by 205% to 212% relative to autocracies, by 110% to 118% relative to democracies 
having other constitutional arrangements, and by 45% to 48% compared to parliamentary 
non-federal governments or federal non-parliamentary states. Last but not least, we still 
uncover robust evidences that the top-down effect of parliamentary governments outperforms 
the bottom-up effect of federal states (see columns 4-6). 
5.2. Alternative measures of political institutions            
In our benchmark analysis we equally assumed the presence of a democratic regime in a given 
sub-period if all three years were democratic. Since this definition could be viewed as 
conservative, we check sensitivity of our results by considering the following categorical 
variable: for a given country i at subperiod t, this new set of variables equals to 0 if autocratic, 
1/3 if democratic during one year, 2/3 if democratic during two years, and 1 if democratic 
during three years.
27
             
 Table B1 and B2 show that our results are robust to these changes in our political 
institutions variables. Democracies still have a significant and positive effect on financial 
development (columns 1 to 3). Columns 4-6 and 7-9 confirm that parliamentary governments 
and federal states still outperform the overall effect of democracies on banking sector depth. 
Conversely, electoral rules do not lead to any statistical significant financial development gain 
compared to democracies as a whole. Moreover, our results also confirm the significant and 
positive synergistic effect resulting from the interaction between parliamentary governments 
and federal states (Table 17 columns 1-3). Finally and interestingly, we do not find strong 
evidence on the prevailing effect of parliamentary governments over federal states (see 
columns 4-6). 
5.3. Accounting for outliers                                                                                     
Since our baseline results could be driven by the highly developed banking sector of some 
countries like for instance Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland or the United 
                                                          
27 With this approach, we now interpret our results as the "magnitude" effect of political institutions on financial 
development, and not just as an occurrence effect. 
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States (which are also democratic regimes); we now check the robustness of our results from 
dropping outliers. To this end, we reestimate our specification including all control variables 
using Weighted Least Square (WLS) estimator. In sum, this estimator consists first in 
dropping observations with a Cook distance higher than one, and then reestimate our model 
with OLS estimator, where each remaining observation are weighted according to its 
estimated Cook distance.
28
          
 Table C shows that each baseline result is not sensitive to outliers, since we still find a 
significant and positive effect of democracies on banking sector depth (column 1). This latter 
effect is still smaller than the effect of parliamentary governments and federal states on 
financial development (column 2 and 4). In addition, parliamentary governments still 
outperform federal states (column 5), and the synergistic effect resulting from the interaction 
between these two political institutions remain statistically significant (column 6). 
5.4. Accounting for reverse causality              
Acemoglu et al. (2004) point that there could be a serious reverse causality issues between 
financial development and political institutions, since the former may help to mobilize 
resources to consolidate political reforms and ensure democratic transition. An alternative 
explanation provided by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) emphasizes that financial development 
implied stronger outside pressures, which in turn account for democratization.  As a result, 
in Table D, we account for these arguments by estimating the effect of our financial 
development index on each political institutions variable by using a panel random effect 
probit model for political regimes and constitutional arrangement variables and a panel 
random effect ordered probit for the synergy variable. In reference to the literature on the 
determinants of political institutions (Persson and Tabellini 2003; Voigt, 2011), we further 
account for the following control variables in each specification: the logarithm of GDP per 
capita, the age of democracies, the fraction of neighboring countries having the same political 
institutions and a time trend.
29
         
 Table D shows that whatever the political institutions we account for, we do not find 
any evidence from a statistically significant effect of financial development on political 
                                                          
28 Cook distance Di for country i is computed in the following way:
2
( )
1
( )
.
n
j ijj
i
Y Y
D
p MSE




 ; where jY  is the predicted 
value of the dependent variable for country j in the full model; ( )j iY  is the predicted value of the dependent variable for 
country j in a model excluding observation i; p is the number of model parameters to be estimated and MSE stands for Mean 
Square Errors. The exhaustive list of dropped countries is available upon request.  
29 The term neighboring countries refers to countries belonging to the same geographic region as country i.  
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institutions.
30
 As a result, the positive effects of parliamentary governments and federal states 
on financial development we have previously uncovered, is not subjected to reverse causality 
bias. 
6.  Conclusion  
The political economy of finance literature emphasizes the critical role of political institutions 
in promoting financial development and related empirical findings highlights a robust positive 
effect of democratic regimes on financial development compared to dictatorships. In this 
paper, we go one step further and show that although democratic regimes appear to 
significantly and positively increase financial development, the simple opposition between 
democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to account for differences in terms of financial 
development between countries, since the financial development enhancing effect of 
democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work.   
 Indeed, by disaggregating the overall effect of democracies on financial development, 
we highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic regimes 
and financial development. The positive effect of democracies on financial development is 
explained by the presence of very specific political institutions, namely: parliamentary forms 
of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. In line with political governance 
theories, these constitutional arrangements characterize a complementary relationship 
between a low horizontal separation of powers (centralist paradigm) and a strong vertical 
separation of powers (federalist paradigm). Thus, financial development will be all the more 
important if democratic regimes allow horizontal flexibility and vertical stability in the 
political decision-making process.        
 Therefore, our results stress that only advocating the implementation of democratic 
regimes in developing countries in order to promote economic and financial development is 
not sufficient. Since, developed banking sector is a precondition for sustainable economic 
growth and poverty reduction, policymakers must have to remind that specific constitutional 
arrangements may play a critical role in achieving macroeconomic objectives and promote 
populations well-being.  
                                                          
30 Appendix A presents the sources and the construction of these control variables, and Tables G1 and G2 provide descriptive 
statistics. 
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Appendix 1 
List of variables 
Financial depth: banking sector depth index based on the first factor derived from the 
implementation of a Principal Components Analysis on private credit/GDP, banks assets/GDP 
and liquid liabilities/GDP, from Global Financial Development Database (2012). 
Financial depth2: banking sector depth index based on the first factor derived from the 
implementation of a Principal Components Analysis on private credit/GDP, liquid 
liabilities/GDP and deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank 
assets, from Global Financial Development Database (2012). 
Credits to GDP (%): private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP from Global Financial Development Database (2012). 
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%): M3/GDP from Global Financial Development Database 
(2012). 
Bank assets to GDP (%): total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of GDP from 
Global Financial Development Database (2012). 
Assets ratio (%): deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank 
assets from Global Financial Development Database (2012). 
Political regimes: dummy variable = 1 if Polity2 index >0, = 0 otherwise, author’s 
construction based on Polity IV database from Marshall and Jaggers (2010). 
 
Governement forms: dummy variables = 1 if Presidential/Semi-Presidential/Parliamentary 
forms of governments & Polity2 index >0, = 0 otherwise, author’s construction based on 
Cheibub and al. (2009). 
 
Electoral rules: dummy variables = 1 if Majoritarian/Mixed/Proportional electoral rules & 
Polity2 index >0, = 0 otherwise, author’s construction based on Bormann and Golder (2013). 
 
State forms: dummy variables = 1 if Unitary/Federal states & Polity2 index >0, = 0 
otherwise, author’s construction based on CIA The World Factbook (2013) & Perspective 
Monde website from Sherbrook University. 
 
Synergy: ordered variable which for a given country i in subperiod t equals to 0 if autocratic, 
1 if democratic, 2 if democratic with a parliamentary government form or a federal state form, 
and 3 if democratic with a parliamentary government form and a federal state form, author’s 
construction. 
Log of (1+Age of democraties): the age of democracies equals to the average number of 
years by three-year sub-periods since a political regime is democratic (i.e. Polity2 index >0) 
and was not reversed until the end of our sample, author’s construction based on Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) for old democratic regimes and from the Polity2 index for recent democratic 
regimes.  
 
Log GDP per capita: logarithm of Purchasing Power Parity converted GDP per capita 
(Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices, based on Penn World Table 7.1 (2013). 
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GDP growth: growth of GDP per capita, author’s construction, based on Penn World Table 
7.1 (2013). 
 
Log (1 + inflation): logarithm of 1 + annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index, 
author’s construction, based on World Development Indicators (2013). 
 
Log trade openness: logarithm of the sum of imports and exports over GDP at 2005 constant 
price (%), based on Penn World Table 7.1 (2013). 
 
Financial Openness: KOAPEN index based on principal components extracted from 
disaggregated capital and current account restriction from Chinn and Ito (2011). 
 
Inflation volatility: standard deviations of Log (1 + inflation) by three-year sub-periods, 
author’s construction, based on World Development Indicators (2013). 
 
Neighbouring democracy: proportion of democratic regimes in countries belonging to the 
same geographic region as country i.  
Neighbouring government forms: proportion of Presidential/Semi-
Presidential/Parliamentary forms of governments in countries belonging to the same 
geographic region as country i.  
Neighboring electoral rules: proportion of Majoritarian/Mixed/Proportional electoral rules 
in countries belonging to the same geographic region as country i.  
Neighboring state forms: proportion of Unitary/Federal states in countries belonging to the 
same geographic region as country i.  
Neighboring synergy: mean of the synergy variable for countries belonging to the same 
geographic region as country i.  
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Appendix 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
Table A. Political repartition of the 140 countries in our sample 
Permanent Permanent Political 
Dictatorships Democracies Transitions 
37 countries 48 countries 55 countries 
 Afghanistan Argentina Albania 
 Angola  Australia   Burundi 
 United Arab Emirates  Austria  Benin 
Burkina Faso  Belgium  Bangladesh 
 Bahrain  Bolivia  Bulgaria  
Bhutan Botswana  Brazil 
 China   Canada   Central African Republic 
 Cote d'Ivoire  Switzerland   Chile 
Cameroon   Colombia  Congo Brazzaville  
 Cuba  Costa Rica    Comoros  
 Egypt  Cyprus   Djibouti 
 Gabon Czech Republic  Algeria 
Guinea  Germany  Ethiopia  
 Equatorial Guinea   Denmark   Fiji 
Iraq   Dominican Republic Ghana  
 Jordan   Ecuador  Gambia 
 Kuwait  Spain  Guinea Bissau 
Laos  Estonia Guatemala 
Libya Finland  Guyana 
 Morocco France  Croatia  
Mauritania United Kingdom   Haiti  
 Oman  Greece   Hungary 
 Qatar Honduras  Indonesia 
 Rwanda  India  Iran 
Saudi Arabia Ireland   Kenya 
 Sudan  Israel  Cambodia 
 Singapore  Italy  Korea South 
 Somalia  Jamaica   Lebanon 
Swaziland Japan  Liberia 
 Syria Sri Lanka  Lesotho 
 Chad  Moldova  Madagascar  
 Togo Macedonia  Mexico 
Tunisia  Mauritius  Mali  
 Tanzania  Malaysia  Mongolia 
 Uganda Netherlands Mozambique 
Vietnam  Norway   Malawi 
 Yemen New Zealand  Niger 
  Papua New Guinea  Nigeria 
  Portugal  Nicaragua 
   Russia  Nepal 
   El Salvador Pakistan 
   Slovenia   Panama  
  Sweden Peru 
   Trinidad   Philippines 
   Turkey Poland 
   United States  Paraguay 
   Venezuela  Romania 
   South Africa Senegal 
    Solomon Islands 
    Sierra Leone  
     Thailand 
     Uruguay 
    Congo Kinshasa  
  
Zambia  
     Zimbabwe  
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Table B1. Constitutional arrangements in the 48 permanent democracies in our sample 
Country  Gvt. forms Electoral rules State forms Const reforms 
Argentina  Pres Prop Fed   
Australia Parl Maj Fed   
Austria Semi pres Prop Fed   
Belgium Parl Prop Fed   
Bolivia Pres Prop Uni 1984-1996 
  Pres Mixt Uni 1997-2007 
Botswana N-A N-A Uni   
Canada Parl Maj Fed   
Switzerland Pres Prop Fed   
Colombia Pres Prop Uni   
Costa-Rica Pres Prop Uni   
Cyprus Pres Prop Uni   
Czech Rep (obs : 1993-2007) Parl Prop Uni   
Germany Parl Mixt Fed   
Denmark Parl Prop Uni   
Dominican Rep Pres Prop Uni   
Ecuador Pres Prop Uni 1984-1997 
  Pres Mixt Uni 1998-2001 
  Pres Prop Uni 2002-2007 
Spain Parl Prop Fed   
Estonia (obs : 1991-2007) Parl Prop Uni   
Finland Semi pres Prop Uni   
France Semi pres Maj Uni 1984-1985 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1986-1987 
  Semi pres Maj Uni 1988-2007 
United Kingdom Parl Maj Uni   
Greece Parl Prop Uni   
Honduras Pres Prop Uni   
India Parl Maj Fed   
Ireland Semi pres Prop Uni   
Israel Parl Prop Uni   
Italy Parl Prop Uni 1984-1993 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1994-2005 
  Parl Prop Uni 2006-2007 
Jamaica Parl Maj Uni   
Japan Parl Maj Uni 1984-1995 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1996-2007 
Sri Lanka Pres Maj Uni 1984-1988 
  Pres Prop Uni 1989-2007 
Moldova (obs : 1991-2007) Parl Prop Uni 1991-1996 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1997-1999 
  Parl Prop Uni 2000-2007 
Macedonia (obs : 1991-2007) Semi pres Maj Uni 1991-1997 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1998-2007 
Mauritius Parl Maj Uni   
Malaysia N-A N-A Fed   
Netherlands Parl Prop Uni   
Norway Parl Prop Uni   
New Zealand Parl Maj Uni 1984-1995 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1996-2007 
Papua New Guinea Parl Maj Uni   
Portugal Semi pres Prop Uni   
Russia (obs : 1992-2007) N-A N-A Fed   
El Salvador Pres Prop Uni   
Slovenia (obs : 1991-2007) Semi pres Prop Uni 1991-2002 
  Parl Prop Uni 2003-2007 
Sweden Parl Prop Uni   
Trinidad and Tobago Parl Maj Uni   
Turquey Parl Prop Uni 1984-1986 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1987-1994 
  Parl Prop Uni 1995-2007 
United States Pres Maj Fed   
Venezuela Pres Prop Fed 1984-1992 
  Pres Mixt Fed 1993-2007 
South Africa N-A N-A Fed   
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Table B2. Constitutional arrangements in the 55 countries with political transitions in our sample  
Country  Gvt. forms Electoral rules State forms Democratic periods 
Albania Parl Mixt Uni 1990-1995 
  Parl Mixt Uni 1997-2007 
Burundi Pres Prop Uni 2002-2007 
Benin Pres Prop Uni 1991-2007 
Bangladesh Parl Maj Uni 1991-2006 
Bulgaria Semi pres Prop Uni 1990-2007 
Brazil Pres Prop Fed 1985-2007 
Central Africa Rep Semi pres Maj Uni 1993-2002 
Chile Pres Prop Uni 1989-2007 
Congo Brazzaville Semi pres Maj Uni 1992-1996 
Comoros Semi pres Maj Fed 1990-1994 
  N-A Maj Fed 1996-1998 
  Pres Maj Fed 2002-2007 
Djibouti N-A N-A Uni 1999-2007 
Algeria N-A N-A Uni 2004-2007 
Ethiopia N-A N-A Fed 1993-2007 
Fiji N-A N-A Uni 1984-1986 
  Parl Maj Uni 1990-2005 
Ghana Pres Maj Uni 1996-2007 
Gambia N-A N-A Uni 1984-1993 
Guinea Bissau N-A N-A Uni 1994-1997 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 1999-2002 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 2005-2007 
Guatemala Pres Prop Uni 1986-2007 
Guyana N-A N-A Uni 1992-2007 
Croatia Semi pres Mixt Uni 1999 
  Semi pres Prop Uni 2000-2007 
Haiti N-A N-A Uni 1990 
  N-A N-A Uni 1994-1999 
  N-A N-A Uni 2005-2007 
Hungary Parl Mixt Uni 1989-2007 
Indonesia Pres Prop Uni 1999-2007 
Iran N-A N-A Uni 1997-2003 
Kenya Pres Maj Uni 2002-2007 
Cambodia N-A N-A Uni 1990-1996 
  N-A N-A Uni 1998-2007 
Korea South Pres Mixt Uni 1987-2007 
Lebanon (obs : 1984-1989; 2005-2007) N-A N-A Uni 2005-2007 
Liberia Pres Maj Uni 2003-2007 
Lesotho N-A N-A Uni 1993-2007 
  N-A N-A Uni 1999-2007 
Madagascar Semi pres Prop Uni 1991-1997 
  Semi pres Mixt Uni 1998-2006 
  Semi pres Maj Uni 2007 
Mexico Pres Mixt Fed 1994-2007 
Mali Semi pres Maj Uni 1992-2007 
Mongolia Parl Maj Uni 1990-1991 
  Semi pres Maj Uni 1992-2007 
Mozambique N-A N-A Uni 1994-2007 
Malawi Pres Maj Uni 1994-2007 
Niger Semi pres Mixt Uni 1991-1995 
  Semi pres Mixt Uni 1999-2007 
Nigeria Pres Maj Fed 1999-2007 
Nicaragua Pres Prop Uni 1990-2007 
Nepal Parl Maj Uni 1990-2001 
  N-A Maj Uni 2006-2007 
Pakistan Parl Maj Fed 1988-1998 
  N-A Maj Fed 2007 
Panama Pres Mixt Uni 1989-2007 
Peru Pres Prop Uni 1984-1991 
  Pres Prop Uni 1993-2007 
Philippines Pres Maj Uni 1986-1997 
  Pres Mixt Uni 1998-2007 
Poland Semi pres Prop Uni 1989-2007 
Paraguay Pres Mixt Uni 1989-1992 
  Pres Prop Uni 1993-2007 
Romania Semi pres Prop Uni 1990-2007 
Senegal Semi pres Mixt Uni 2000-2007 
Solomon Islands Parl Maj Uni 1984-1999 
  Parl Maj Uni 2004-2007 
Sierra Leone Pres Prop Uni 1996 
  Pres Prop Uni 2001 
  Pres Maj Uni 2002-2007 
Thailand Parl Maj Uni 1984-1990 
  Parl Maj Uni 1992-2000 
  Parl Mixt Uni 2001-2005 
Uruguay Pres Prop Uni 1985-2007 
Congo Kinshasa N-A N-A Uni 2003-2007 
Zambia N-A N-A Uni 1991-2007 
Zimbabwe N-A N-A Uni 1984-1986 
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Table C. Within and between variability of political institutions variables 
  Democracy Presidential Semi-pres. Parliamentary Majoritarian Mixed Proportional Federal  Unitary 
Within Std. 0.28 0.17 0 .15 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.10 0.26 
Between Std.  0.42 0.35 0 .26 0.39 0.29 0.19 0.41 0.32 0.42 
 
Table D. Overview of Political Institutions 
 
Demo. Pres. Semi-pres. Parl. Maj. Mixed Prop. Uni. Fed. 
Regions                   
World 0.58 0.38 0.19 0.43 0.30 0.15 0.55 0.78 0.22 
East Asia & Pacific 0.66 0.23 0.07 0.70 0.69 0.27 0.04 0.82 0.18 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.86 0.00 0.52 0.48 0.04 0.20 0.76 0.93 0.07 
Latin America 0.85 0.89 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.74 0.81 0.19 
Middle-East & North Africa 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 1.00 0.00 
North America 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
South Asia 0.58 0.27 0.00 0.73 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.61 0.39 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.33 0.44 0.42 0.14 0.64 0.17 0.19 0.81 0.19 
Western Europe 1.00 0.12 0.29 0.59 0.11 0.09 0.80 0.71 0.29 
Incomes                   
Low-income 0.36 0.40 0.29 0.31 0.59 0.10 0.31 0.83 0.17 
Lower-middle income 0.61 0.62 0.13 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.62 0.92 0.08 
Higher-middle income 0.69 0.53 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.30 0.55 0.70 0.30 
High-income none OECD 0.41 0.36 0.20 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
High-income OECD 1.00 0.09 0.24 0.67 0.28 0.12 0.60 0.62 0.38 
Periods                   
1984-1986 0.39 0.37 0.11 0.52 0.34 0.02 0.64 0.72 0.28 
1987-1989 0.41 0.39 0.10 0.51 0.35 0.06 0.59 0.70 0.30 
1990-1992 0.54 0.35 0.19 0.46 0.32 0.12 0.56 0.79 0.21 
1993-1995 0.61 0.34 0.23 0.43 0.35 0.12 0.53 0.78 0.22 
1996-1998 0.62 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.31 0.16 0.53 0.78 0.22 
1999-2001 0.65 0.38 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.22 0.53 0.80 0.20 
2002-2004 0.68 0.43 0.19 0.38 0.27 0.20 0.53 0.79 0.21 
2005-2007 0.69 0.43 0.20 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.54 0.80 0.20 
Colonial Origins                   
Spain 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.83 0.17 
English 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.61 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.78 0.22 
French 0.23 0.24 0.76 0.00 0.42 0.32 0.25 0.88 0.12 
Portuguese 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.47 
Legal Origins                   
English 0.59 0.27 0.05 0.68 0.77 0.03 0.20 0.72 0.28 
German 0.98 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.49 0.41 0.38 0.62 
French 0.52 0.61 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.70 0.80 0.20 
Socialist 0.55 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.60 1.00 0.00 
Note: first column displays the proportion of observations with democratic regimes in our sample. Other columns display the proportion of each 
constitutional arrangement in democratic regimes. 
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Table E: Overview of Financial Development  
Variables Financial_depth 
Private 
credit/GDP 
Bank assets/GDP 
Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
Regions         
World -0.02 36.60 45.49 45.69 
East Asia & Pacific 0.46 58.14 69.27 67.26 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
-0.01 25.52 36.78 36.83 
Latin America -0.06 26.78 32.63 33.91 
Middle-East & North Africa 0.38 35.66 51.71 60.88 
North America 0.91 68.83 77.41 77.48 
South Asia -0.09 20.36 28.56 39.88 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.87 13.10 16.94 23.26 
Western Europe 1.03 84.70 101.01 80.86 
Income         
Low-income -0.75 14.66 19.02 26.17 
Lower-middle income 0.02 29.08 37.53 43.26 
Higher-middle income 0.16 35.23 43.88 44.23 
High-income none OECD 1.09 75.34 95.84 99.98 
High-income OECD 1.02 83.87 100.40 81.17 
Periods         
1984-1986 -0.10 31.64 40.49 42.45 
1987-1989 -0.08 33.57 42.23 43.00 
1990-1992 -0.14 32.79 40.72 42.13 
1993-1995 -0.11 33.79 43.26 42.69 
1996-1998 -0.07 35.80 45.18 44.12 
1999-2001 0.02 38.77 47.53 47.39 
2002-2004 0.06 39.62 49.05 49.34 
2005-2007 0.15 43.95 52.40 51.55 
Note: average of each financial development variable by regions, income levels and periods. 
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Table F1. Overview of Controls 
Variables GDP/cap GDP growth Trade openness 
Financial 
openness 
Inflation 
Inflation 
volatility 
Regions             
World 5800.76 1.81 68.68 0.10 45.31 48.90 
East Asia & Pacific 6688.58 3.34 87.81 0.33 7.43 4.59 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 3346.88 1.68 75.67 -0.09 59.23 55.46 
Latin America 3012.93 1.59 61.30 0.26 112.72 128.81 
Middle-East & North Africa 7650.35 1.50 85.41 0.43 16.13 6.67 
North America 26387.97 2.05 40.61 2.46 2.93 0.67 
South Asia 468.09 3.73 45.34 -1.09 7.89 2.61 
Sub-Saharan Africa 725.45 1.04 61.69 -0.70 69.56 74.85 
Western Europe 20737.14 2.19 68.13 1.60 3.63 0.96 
Incomes             
Low-income 418.41 1.31 56.19 -0.74 60.08 63.16 
Lower-middle income 1762.83 1.94 76.38 -0.29 55.38 62.47 
Higher-middle income 5527.38 2.50 79.71 0.53 63.07 58.75 
High-income none OECD 20188.92 1.86 123.75 1.43 9.75 5.41 
High-income OECD 21987.46 2.10 59.35 1.87 3.48 1.00 
Political Regimes             
Autocracy 2784.41 1.29 69.05 -0.41 65.07 71.08 
Democracy 8153.14 2.19 68.53 0.50 34.31 32.65 
Forms of Democracies             
Government Forms             
Presidential 5317.79 2.08 60.36 0.19 90.05 102.98 
Semi-presidential 7967.50 1.62 69.16 0.38 20.81 17.51 
Parliamentary 12508.53 2.41 69.20 0.90 9.32 3.34 
Electoral Rules             
Majoritarian 7594.81 2.16 64.16 0.40 9.26 4.82 
Mixt 8465.08 1.99 64.91 0.83 8.53 3.84 
Proportional 9608.91 2.12 67.12 0.51 68.39 75.22 
State Forms             
Unitary 6604.77 2.17 71.17 0.38 33.17 34.22 
Federal 11952.84 2.02 54.83 0.63 58.78 55.52 
Note: average of each control variable by regions, income levels, political regimes and constitutional arrangements. 
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Table F2. Descriptive statistics of dependent, interest and control variables 
  Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Fi_depth 894 -0.02 0.99 -7.29 2.03 
Fi_depth2 832 -0.02 0.99 -5.88 1.86 
Credits 923 36.61 35.66 0.01 187.55 
Liquid Liabilities 898 45.69 33.61 0.06 235.44 
Bank assets 925 45.49 40.64 0.02 244.32 
Assets ratio 895 74.71 23.79 10.75 99.75 
Democracy 1092 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Presidential 1008 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Semi presidential 1008 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Parliamentary 1008 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Majoritarian 1010 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Mixed 1010 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Proportional 1010 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Unitary 1092 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Federal 1092 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Synergy 1008 0.85 0.94 0.00 3.00 
Age democracy 1092 21.96 39.80 0.00 207.00 
GDP per cap. 1051 5800.76 8892.74 62.68 41634.33 
GDP growth 1049 1.81 4.24 -32.32 39.88 
Inflation 931 2.11 1.17 -1.03 7.99 
Inflation volatility 952 48.90 511.32 0.02 13015.49 
Financial openness 1048 0.10 1.56 -1.86 2.46 
Trade openness 1098 68.68 42.94 1.85 423.20 
Neighbouring democracy 1092 0.52 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Neighbouring presidential 1008 0.21 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Neighbouring semi presidential 1008 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.63 
Neighbouring parliamentary 1008 0.23 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Neighbouring majoritarian 1010 0.17 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Neighbouring mixed 1010 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.37 
Neighbouring proportional 1010 0.30 0.32 0.00 0.90 
Neighbouring unitary 1092 0.45 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Neighbouring federal 1092 0.13 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Neighbouring synergy 1008 0.58 0.69 0.00 0.80 
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Table G. Bilateral correlation between the most financial development enhancing constitutional 
arrangements 
  Parliamentary Mixed Federal 
Parliamentary 1.0000 
 
 
Mixed 0.1615*** 1.0000 
 
Federal 0.2095*** 0.1166*** 1.0000 
Note : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table I. Bilateral correlation between financial development variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Financial depth 
Private 
credit/GDP Bank assets/GDP Liquid Liabilities 
Financial depth 1.0000 
    
Private 
credit/GDP 0.7871*** 1.0000 
   
Bank assets/GDP 0.8081*** 0.9713*** 1.0000 
 
Liquid Liabilities 0.7915*** 0.8698*** 0.9056*** 1.0000 
Note : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 3 - Robustness 
Table A1.  Alternative Measure of Financial Development: Political Regimes and 
Constitutional Arrangements Variables 
  
Political Regimes Government Forms Electoral Rules State Forms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD 
Democracy 0.783*** 0.704*** 0.777*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.142] [0.128] [0.268]                   
Presidential   
 
  0.574*** 0.493** 0.504* 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.171] [0.241] [0.288] 
  
  
  
  
Semi presidential 
  
  0.572** 0.416 0.404 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.224] [0.298] [0.357] 
  
  
  
  
Parliamentary 
 
 
  1.133*** 1.098*** 1.075*** 
  
  
  
  
        [0.167] [0.219] [0.412]             
Majoritarian 
  
  
  
  0.711*** 0.607*** 0.645*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.173] [0.191] [0.246] 
  
  
Mixed 
  
  
  
  0.908*** 0.781*** 0.779*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.230] [0.217] [0.275] 
  
  
Proportional 
  
  
  
  0.780*** 0.698*** 0.659* 
  
  
              [0.166] [0.211] [0.368]       
Unitary 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.694*** 0.621*** 0.682*** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.143] [0.133] [0.245] 
Federal 
  
  
  
  
  
  1.074*** 0.994*** 1.147** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.205] [0.340] [0.550] 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 832 613 543 761 553 487 762 554 488 832 613 543 
R-squared 0.156 0.785 0.821 0.234 0.792 0.829 0.169 0.792 0.831 0.173 0.787 0.824 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. Alternative measure of financial development: 
first factor extracted from the implementation of a PCA on Credit / GDP; M3 / GDP; Banks assets / Central Bank assets + Banks assets.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A2.  Alternative Measure of Financial Development: Political Systems and Joint Estimates 
  
Synergistic effect Joint estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD 
Synergy 0.479*** 0.455*** 0.450** 
  
  
  [0.0700] [0.0936] [0.176]       
Parliamentary   
 
  0.793*** 0.791*** 0.745** 
  
  
  [0.140] [0.237] [0.371] 
Federal 
  
  0.442** 0.398 0.385 
  
  
  [0.192] [0.384] [0.481] 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 761 553 487 761 553 487 
R-squared 0.237 0.795 0.833 0.2 0.793 0.832 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. Alternative measure of financial development: 
first factor extracted from the implementation of a PCA on Credit /GDP; M3 /GDP; Banks assets /Central Bank assets + Banks assets.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B1.  Alternative Measure of Political Institutions: Political Regimes and Constitutional Arrangements 
Variables 
  
Political Regimes Government Forms Electoral Rules State Forms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD 
Democracy 0.698*** 0.611*** 0.655** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.158] [0.160] [0.276]                   
Presidential   
 
  0.489** 0.375 0.391 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.188] [0.318] [0.377] 
  
  
  
  
Semi presidential 
  
  0.502** 0.351 0.31 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.250] [0.345] [0.411] 
  
  
  
  
Parliamentary 
 
 
  1.076*** 1.016*** 0.902* 
  
  
  
  
       [0.180] [0.297] [0.501]             
Majoritarian 
  
  
  
  0.677*** 0.571** 0.603** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.197] [0.235] [0.304] 
  
  
Mixed 
  
  
  
  0.869*** 0.703** 0.666 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.249] [0.316] [0.422] 
  
  
Proportional 
  
  
  
  0.775*** 0.684** 0.579 
  
  
            [0.181] [0.306] [0.500]       
Unitary 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.608*** 0.528*** 0.566** 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.160] [0.174] [0.265] 
Federal 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.991*** 0.905** 1.007* 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  [0.218] [0.395] [0.568] 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 894 688 606 817 621 543 818 622 544 894 688 606 
R-squared 0.114 0.675 0.738 0.202 0.681 0.764 0.15 0.679 0.762 0.131 0.679 0.74 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. Alternative measure of political institutions: each political 
institution variable equals 0.33, 0.67 or 1 if country i in sub-period t is democratic during one, two or three years respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
Table B2.  Alternative Measure of Political Institutions: Political Systems and Joint Estimates 
  
Synergistic effect Joint estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS FEVD FEVD OLS FEVD FEVD 
Synergy 0.450*** 0.402*** 0.364**       
  [0.0717] [0.0963] [0.162]       
Parliamentary       0.779*** 0.773** 0. 653 
  
  
  [0.145] [0.323] [0.460] 
Federal 
  
  0.400** 0.358 0.341 
        [0.194] [0.437] [0.547] 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 817 621 543 817 621 543 
R-squared 0.207 0.681 0.763 0.18 0.681 0.762 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. Alternative measure of political institutions: each political institution 
variable equals 0.33, 0.67 or 1 if country i in sub-period t is democratic during one, two or three years respectively.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C. Accounting for Outliers 
  
Political 
Regimes 
Government 
Forms 
Electoral 
Rules 
State Forms 
Synergistic 
effect 
Joint 
estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS 
Democracy 0.178***           
  [0.0438]           
Presidential   0.143***         
    [0.0537]         
Semi presidential   0.041         
    [0.0714]         
Parliamentary   0.247***     0.166***   
    [0.0564]     [0.0482]   
Majoritarian     0.199***       
      [0.0561]       
Mixed     0.202**       
      [0.0783]       
Proportional     0.0644       
      [0.0521]       
Unitary       0.149***     
        [0.0443]     
Federal       0.356*** 0.0908   
        [0.0656] [0.0658]   
Synergy           0.112*** 
            [0.0244] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 821 749 750 821 749 749 
R-squared 0.621 0.638 0.635 0.628 0.634 0.639 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. To account for outliers we resort to a Weighted 
Least Square Estimator (WLS). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table D. Accounting for Reverse Causality 
  
Democracy Presidential 
Semi 
presidential 
Parliamentary Majoritarian Mixed Proportional Unitary Federalism Synergy 
Random 
probit 
Random 
probit 
Random 
probit 
Random probit 
Random 
probit 
Random 
probit 
Random 
probit 
Random 
probit 
Random 
probit 
Ordered Random 
probit 
fi_depth -0.1 0.323 0.306 0.931 0.253 -0.35 -0.16 -0.39 0.625 -0.048 
  [0.187] [0.795] [0.685] [0.790] [0.355] [0.372] [0.281] [0.303] [0.970] [0.178] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 888 811 811 811 812 812 812 888 888 811 
Countries 132 124 124 124 124 124 124 132 132 124 
Note: robust standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies are included in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Each model 
controls for the logarithm of GDP per capita, the logarithm of (1+age of democraties), the proportion of neighboring countries having the 
same political regime or constitutional arrangements as country i. Regarding the synergy variable specification, we introduce simultaneously 
the proportion of neighboring countries having parliamentary governments and federal states. All these models also include a time trend. 
